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tHE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE INNOCENT, THE PUNISHMENT OF THE
GUILTY, THE DEFENCE OF PROPERTY AND PERSONAL RIGHTS,
AND THE JUST MAINTENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. ILLUSTRATIONS DRAWN FROM ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE COMMON LAW, AS WELL AS
RECENT TRIALS IN WESTMINSTER HALL AND OTHER .PORTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

TnE adminiftration of justice, in all countries, and at all times,
is a subject broad and difficult, both in its operation and its influence. It is perhaps more indicative, a truer test, of the real
temper and spirit, both of the government and the people of the
state or country, than any other one thing. This is especially
true in regard to the administration of ciminal justice, where
the court is called to hold the scale of justice impartially between
the state and the accused ; or, what is sometimes more difficult,
between the government or different factions or parties, for the
time holding the administrative functions of the gover.ment,.
and the people at large. And this difficulty is greatly enhanced
where offences against the government are concerned; especially
in monarchical governments or states; and more so as those
monarchies partake more of the absolute or despotic character.
It may there well be supposed, that where the judge holds
office at the mere will of the sovereign, and is liable at any
moment, upon the slightest occasion, or none at all, to be removed
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in disgrace, and thus have both the source of present support and
future acquisition removed, in such cases it may well be supposed
that the judge will almost necessarily merely echo the will or
the desire of the sovereign, and that justice will be very little
regarded. Hence very little fairness or purity is expected in
countries under despotic rule, from the administration of justice,
were the will of the sovereign is placed in the scale against the
rights, either of individuals or of the people at large. ' This is a
proposition so obvious as to meet no general denial or question.
If any case occurs where fairness and firmness are exhibited in
the courts of such a country, in opposition to the influence or the
interests of the sovereign, it will be the more admired and praised,
but none the less regarded as exceptional, and not to be counted
upon in the general estimate of consequences and results.
Now this .spirit, it must be remembered, is not peculiar to
despotic governments, for it is natural anc almost necessary that
all governiments and all parties having for the time the possession
of. administrative functions, should desire to have the courts
favorably inclined towards themselves. And this being so, all
governmentA and all governing parties will study to make and
to keep the judicial administration favorable to. their ow. views,
and Will consequently endeavor to frown down or put cown all
opposing views in the courts. This will be done in iifferent"
countries and at different times in ways differing" materially from
each other; but in all cases with the same purpose of controlling
and thus virtually corrupting the purity and independence of the
judicial administration. And so.far as we have observed, this is
none the less true in republics than in monarchies. It is a thing
to be expected everywhere alike. And it is not a thing which
one can fairly consider as within certain reasonable limits. If we
concede the same good faith to others which we All claim for ourselves, we must expect governments and parties, who believe in
the -soundness or the wisdom of their own policies, to labor to
place themselves and their friends, and the doctrines and constructions for which they contend upon the high vantage-grouqd
of universal recognition and acceptance. To expect ainything
less would be to impeach either the good faith,. the courage, or
the zeal of the parties concerned.
Thus it will occur in more despotic gbvernments, as for centuries in the history of the British monarchy, and even at the
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present time in many European states, whose governments, are,
upon the whole, wisely and beneficially administered, that the
judges will bb removed or removable at the mere arbitrary will
of the sovereign.
And equally, in such governments, the
sovereigns-as did the British monarchs until the accession of
William and Mary, after the Revolution of 1688-will claim and
exercise, at will, the power to suspend the operation of any
law, written or unwritten, so long as to them shall seem for the
interest of the state. These are the usual prerogatives of arbitrary and despotic empires, without which they would cease to
be such.
Now, it must be remembered that these defects in governmental, and especially judicial, administrators, are not peculiar
to despotic empires or states, and certainly not confined to governments of any particular organization. The short experience
of our own happy and prosperous country, whose government is
free and popular beyond all former precedent, is not without
some lessons of loud admonition in this same direction. The
courts,' which at first were very generally modelled upon the
independent structure and tenure of office of the English courts
since the Revolution of 1688, have been gradually receding from
that independent position, until, at the present day, there is
scarcely one state in the Union where that character extends to
all its judicial tribunals. In Massachusetts, for the security as
well as the credit of that-ancient and honorable commonwealth,
the courts and the profession of the law have succeeded in pacifying
the politicians and the legislature for thi .time being with the
rather plausible theory that the Supreme Judicial Court, being the
highest judicial tribunal in the state, is so efihbalmed or embedded
in the constitution, that its soundness cannot be violated by any
profane legislative hands. And this is all which, could be saved
from legislative demolition. And in order to secure even that
last fortress of protection and defence against the rashnegs and
delusions of popular prejudice or passion or fury of any kind,
they have been compelled to adopt the suicidal policy of compromise by throwing a tub to the whale, as it has been sometimes
called. In order to pacify the insatiable demands of popular
ferment and political or legislative aspiration! for advancement
or progress, sometimes unjustly characterized as improvement, it
has been found. indispensable, even in this staid' old common.
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wealth, to concede that all the inferior tribunals whose judges
held office by the same.permanent tenure, dum be.ne se fes8erint;
that all those inferior tribunals whose judges numbered ten times
as many as those of the Supreme Judicial Court, might be re-.
modelled at the will of the legislature. And this has been
literally accomplished within the last fifteen years, for no better
object in fact than to change the names of the courtsand thus
be enabled to appoint another set of judges, some of whom were
younger men than their predecessors, and some were not; some
Qf whom were better qualified to fill the places than those whom
they succeeded, and some were not; but all were men in accord
with the principles and the policies of the existing government.
Now it must be conceded that in thus volunteering to sugiest
that there is no difference in principle between the inferior and
superior tribunals of a state, and that the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts must put off its time-honored and venerable
functions, and ere long consent to lie down in the same legisla.
tiye sepulchre, thus prepared for all the subordinate tribunals of
-this noble old commonwealth, we feel not a little guilty of the
offence of betraying our fellows, struggling manfully in the same
honorable cause for the perpetuity of constitutional government.
And we would fain hope there really may be more soundness in
this, as it seems to us, rather shadowy distinction between the
inviolability of the highest and the subordinate judicial tribunals
of this commonwealth, than now occurs .to us. But we all know,
that in the neighboring state of New Hampshire, where the constitution,'in regard to the tenure of the judicial office, is- modelled
carefully upon that of Massachusetts, the highest court in the
state has-had the'same fate as all its subordinates, and has actually been remodelled by the legislature, not less than three times,
within the memory of some now living, with no -ther purpose or
pretence, than to change the name of the court, and thus get rid
of the judges. So that in this state, where the tenure of office of
the judges is, in terms, the same as in Massachusetts, or in England, dum bene ae g sserint, the actual security from removal,
upon any change in the ascendancy of political parties, is realIy
less than in the neighboring state of Vermont, where-the judges
are elected annually by the legislature, and where, by immemofial
usage, ripened into law, the judges are selected without reference
to party, or political bias, and are continued indefinitely by a
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furmal re-election, unless some cogent reasons exist, demanding
some change, in regard to which all parties are agreed. Thus
showing very satisfactorily, that the actual facility of change, in
popular governments, sometimes actually conduces to the stability
of the judiciary, while the opposite not unfrequently begets a
popular distrust and uneasiness, not so much on account of existing
evils, as of those apprehended in the future.
But having said so'much in regard to the manifest disposition
among the American states to reduce the tenure of judicial office
to a brief term of years, and in most cases to subject it to the test
of popular elections, we feel bound to add, that it has not seemed
to us, that this could fairly be laid to the account, chiefly, or to
any *considerable degree, of popular impulses or desires. The
great mass of the people are, no doubt, deeply and vitally interested in having and maintaining, permanently, the ablest, most
fearless, and independent judiciary, which the wisdom of man can
devise. Wheiever the appointment and the iction of the judiciary
has been brought near enough to the people to have them properly appreciate its importance, it has always been found?, that a
fearless and able judiciary was sufficiently safe in their hands.
And although they do not readily volunteer to extend the term
of judicial office, they are always content to let it remain where
it is. It has always been found, hitherto, that movements in-the
different states, to limit the term or weaken the tenure of judicial
office, have proceeded from those who hoped sometime to obtaift
the position themselves, or who desired the places :as* political
capital, to distribute among their followefs., or else dreaded the
opposition or the control of an independent judiciary, as an
obstacle to legislative and other reforms, in the municipal administration. With the exception of these three classes, there would
never have been any difficulty in maintaining the. perfectly independent tenure of judicial office in all those states where it was
first adopted. The interests of a permanent judiciary have been
betrayed, by political demagogues and time-serving placemen.
and not by tne people at large.
And, sooner or later, it is very obvious that the American
States will have to consider the question of the indispensable
necessity of an able and independent judiciary, in order to the
proper maintenance of constitutional government. That was first
secured after a struggle of many hundreds of years, in the British
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Government, at the period of the Revolution of 1688. And from
that day to this it has proved the mightiest bulwark of the British
constitutional government. We do not here refer, of course, to
any written constitution, for, aside from some few ancient charters,
the Magna Oharta, the Petition of Right, anil the Bill of Rights,
ther.e is, as every student in the history of British constitutional
law must know, no such thing as a written constitution in the
British Empire. But it is none the less a constitutional government, and one based upon well-settled and recognised principles,
and principles lying at the very foundation of all the American
constitutions. There is no guarantee of constitutional freedom in
America which is not, as every well-read lawyer knows, extracted
from the commbn law of our British ancestors. And one chnnot
enter the superior courts in Westminster Hall, or Lincoln's Inn,
and not feel that the character and temper, the wisdom and forbearance, of the English judiciary has very much to do with the
quiet and good order of this little island. At the very moment
of this writing, there is wide-spread evidence of discontent among
large masses of people, not only in Ireland, but in England. We
have not only Fenianism in Ireland, which is in its demands and
pretensions the most absurd and hopeless thing' imaginable, as
dreamy and unsubstantial as the Entertainments of the Arabian
Nights; but at the same time a bond fide and serious disturbance, and one calling for the exercise of great -wisdom and* forbearance, not only in the executive government, but in the jddiciary ; .not only this, but there is the serious disturbance at Manchester, the actual assassinatiou of the police in open day, and
the attempted or threatened assassination of the police in other
cities ; the conflicts and repeated murders growing out of trades
unions and labor strikes, and the. disaffection existing in Devonshire and Oxford, and possibly in other portions .of the island, in
regard to low wages and the high price of bread. All this, and
much else, which might be fairly named as indicative of discontent, more or less serious or extensive, might well be supposed to
demand the wisdom'-and the energy of the ablest and wisest
administration, both civil and judicial.
But all this, and ten times more, if it should occur, will scarcely
ui oduce a ripple upon the surface of the civil administration.
Not that there are not some discontented spirits. There will
always be -men enough, in all states, and under all social or poli-
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,ical organizations, who would be glad to secure a redistribution
of property; and there will be found, in all free governments,
some men, in the better conditions of life, who have no desire on
their own account to effect any such redistribution of estates, but
b ho will, either from over-sympathy with the sufferings and distress of the poorer classes, and from not sufficiently reflecting
upon the incurable nature of these difficulties; or else from want
of comprehension, or. indifference to consequences, or, what is
still more reckless and desperate, from the desire of popular
favor and influence, will give more or less countenance to these
impracticable demands. We have had experience of this, from
leading men, both in Parliament and in Congress, within the last
twelve months-and from men of high standing and unquestionable patriotism, in both countries, in the advocacy of what, in
plain English, really amounts to a redistribution of property-if
it has any sensible meaning.
But, amid all this, and any amount of ordinary lawlessness and
disturbance in this great Babel of cities, the largest and almost
the wickedest, "and really the least arbitrarily governed of any
great city in the world, with the hundred other cities and large
towns in the little island of 'Great Britain, scarcely more than
five hundred miles in extent, what could be accomplished, withsuch universal freedom, and such unquestionable exemption from
all arbitrary exercise of power, either by the general executive
officers or the police of the towns and cities, except by a judicial
administration, above all possible doubt or question; and one which
the people felt to be their best friend and surest defence I What
security exists for rights of property or person except in the
judiciary ? The legislature, in all times of disturbance, will be
the first to propose the concession of part which is demanded,
and thus by degrees yield the whole.
In a short visit to the courts at Westminster Hall, for two days
in succession, this fact was deeply impressed upon us. We. there
saw, indeed, men of ordinary human infirmity, Vith passions and
prejudices no doubt such as fall to the common lot, sitting in their
ancient places, which had come down from the creation of the
Aula Regis, dating back almost to the period of the Norman
conquest; but men who felt the support of the prestige and
the traditions of eight hundred years to back them; nien who
had all their lives witnessed the field of Runnymead, where
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the Magna Charta of English liberty was signed and sealed by
King John and the English barons; who had looked upon, and
read, and pondered, the original instrument, for fifty years;
who knew every word of it, and all its commentaries and
amendments by heart; and, above all, men who had imbibed,
with their earliest mental culture, the sense of the soundness of
British law, and the rights of British subjects ; a thing to earn
and settle which had cost centuries of toil, and treasure and
blood too; upon which no price could be -placed by any man not
base enough to become a slave himself.
- With such men for judges, holding office beyond the limit of
all earthly control, unless forfeited by crime, which no honest man
ever takes into any account, in estimating the security of his possessions, what temptation was there to know any man's person in
judgment, or to feel any interest, or influence, beyond that of
simple justice ? It is impossible to witness an argument before
any of the Courts in bane, in Westminster Hall, and not feel that
the judges- the counsel on both sides, and the parties, if present,
which seldom is the case, as well as the bystanders, who are
often very numerous, are all striving, consciously and quietly,
towards one result, to find out, in the shortest way and time, the
exact truth and justice of the case.- So that, if the presiding
judge, or, what is often the case, all the judges in succession,

interpose ever so formidable objections, there is no fluttering
among the counsel at meeting unexpected difficulties, and no fdeling of disappointment among the judges at having objections
satisfactorily and conclusively answered. There seems to be no
pride of opinion among the judges, no unwillingness to yield a
first impression or intimation, but rather, on the contrary, a feeling of satisfaction, if that were wrong, to have it corrected.
In short, one cannot spend an hour in one of these courts, and
not feel that the courts are far more'the courts of the people than
of any other interest. Not that the interests of influential parties
are any less regarded or respected than those of inferior standing; but from the natural presumption, that parties of means and
position will be likely to be more carefully investigated add
taoroughly argued, than those who are less expensively represented, it will always become the duty of upright and impartial
judges, to look carefully to the protection. of the rights and interests of those who have no one else to look after them. This was
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wonderfully illustrated in the late trials, under special commission, both at Manchester and in Dublin. In both these cases the
accused were arraigned for alleged crimes aimed most directly at
the quiet and good order of society, in one case a treasonable
conspiracy against the government, extending through a very
considerable number of disaffected persons, and in the other, the
deliberate assassination of one of the police in open day, and
in cool blood, for the avowed purpose of rescuing a prisoner in
acknowledged lawful custody ! But in all the trials, before both
thesm;o..missions, the deliberation and'watchfulness of the judges,
to PWA
1 the exact truth in all the cases, was so marked and
undijisuted, that no prisoner was heard to utter the least complaint, in regard to the fairness and justice of his trial. And in
the case of those prisoners who chose not to be defended by
counsel, .. j'ddges literally performed the constructive duty
Sassigned~ ~t~he 0o 'mon law of supplying the counsel for the
prisoneis, in. making repeated suggestions to the prisoner to
make inqqu yjaYqring his defence. He abstained from such as
seemed t6idimg in the opposite direction. And then the summing
up of the jrdges, in all these "cases, was so entirely fair and full,
in bringing out all-the just grounds of defence on the part of the
prisoners, that it *as well characterized by some of the journals,
as f .asumming" up for an acquittal." And still there wag no
:"e'mt to imeach, or bring in question, on the part of any one,.
the entire propriety of" this watchfulness of the judges. to secure
an impartial trial for all the prisoners. It seems to be comprehended here, that the only sure way to convict'a guilty man befora
a jury, is to give him all possible chance of acquittal.
And during the present week, in the Court of Common Pleas,
before Lord Chief Justice BOVILL and his associates, the hearing
of a motion on the part of the somewhat notorious Miss Fray was
well calculated to test the patience and forbearance of the English
Bench in regard to troublesome suitors who choose to urge their
own claims personally before the court, and thus verify the maxim
in regard to parties who become their own counsel. This lady
had been long in controversy before the court, all the time conducting her own case, until she was fairly thrown in the cause,
and judgment was irrevocably given against her; when, instead
of paying the same at once, she delayed until the capias ad satisfaciendum was placed in the •hands of the sheriff's officer and she
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committed to prison, and then tendered the amount of the payment and less fees than were due to the solicitors. They naturally demanded the entire sum due, as eery lawyer understands
was their right. But Miss Fray, knowing nothing of the law on this
point, which had been settled for fifty years, chose to argue the
matter de novo as res integra, and on a motion for a rule to strike
the attorney's name off the roll, and was very patiently heard to
the end. And then, because the court could not adopt her view,
threatened the Lord Chief Justice to bring the case before the
King's Bench in error. All which was received with the utmost
quiet and equanimity by his lordship, without the slightest
attempt to be witty at the expense of the good lady, or once
looking at the bar over his shoulder to learn whether they commiserated his melancholy condition.' And the same, and more,
I The Times ieport of the case, although omitting the finale, may be interesting:After several practice motions had been disposed of, Miss Fray rose to make
another motion in"
FRAY v. OVENS.
In this case, which was an action to obtain possession of some documents,
brought by Miss Fray, the defendant had a verdict, and the taxed costs against
Mdiss Fray amounted to 241. 8s. 8d. The attorney's bill not being paid, a writ
of capias ad satisfaciendum was issued against her on the judgment, and she was
taken in execution by the sheriff's officers, and complained of many indignities
having been put upon her by the officers and others. She moved on affidavits to
strike Mr. Sadleir, the attorney for the defendant in the action, off the rollg of
attorneys, on the ground that he had conspired vith others to use the process
of the court oppressively to injure her, and had refused to accept a tender of the
amount 6f the bill, and 1l. 5s., sheriff's poundage, which she continded was all
that could be claimed, whereby she had been subjected to the indignities of
which she complained, had been kept some time in prison, and had been put to
expense. It appeared, on going through the figures which the sheriff's officers
were entitled to for execution and poundage, that the total amount of the costs
and execution was 271. Os. 2d. On this appearing, in the course of a long and
rambling statement,
Mr. Justice WILLES said he did not see that Mr. Sadleir or the sheriff's officers
were wrong inInot accepting the tender she had made and refusing her discharge.
She had not tendered what was due. It appeared to tim, therefore, that no case
was made out for the interference of the court. Miss Fray was mistaken in suilposing that the court had power'to grant a rule to strike an attorney off'the'roll
on general statements. There must be some gpecific charge made out against the
attornev as an officer of the court before the court could interfere. Taking the
affidavits in the most favorable sense for Miss Fray's application, the tender was
less than the amount payable ; the court could not, therefore, grant the rule to
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might be said of the forbearing manner in which the somewhat
famous Mrs. Yelverton was treated by the House of Lords a
few months since in arguing an appeal in her own favor brought
from the decree of the Court of Sessions in Scotland. Lord
CRANWORTH, who presided at the trial in the absence of the
Lord Chancellor CHELMSFORD, manifested a degree of indulgence
almost calculated to encourage irregularity, not to use any more
expressive language, which would be, perhaps, fairly justified by
the wonderful pertinacity and want of accommodation manifested
by the good lady during the trial.
We have extended this paper further than we intended, but not
further than seemed needful to illustrate our point, that the more
truly independent the judges are made, the more securely will
the courts become an asylum and a defence foi the innocent,
and the more willingly will the people acquiesde in the conviction
and punishment of the guilty. And we desired, also, to bring
prominently before the profession and the jVublic the vital truth,
that the only reliable security for all property or personal rights
and interests rests in an impartial and fearless administration of
public and private justice ; and that the just principles of free
constitutional government, of which we are all so justly proud
in America, cannot stand secure for all time upon any other basis.
I. F. R.
LOxDON, November 10th, 1867.
strike the attorney off the roll for refusing to take the proper amount tendered
under a ca. sa. It would be a gross injustice if the rule were granted.
Mr. Justice BYLES and Mr. Justice KEATING were-of the same opiniop.
Miss Fray wished to be allowed to bring forward further affidavits which would
strengthen her case.
This the Court refused to allow.
The CsIiEF JUSTICE said he had refrained from interfering or from expressing
an opinion in the case because Miss Fray had stated the other day that he ought
not to do so, as he had been counsel for fourteen years for the Earl of Zetland.
It was unnecessary for him to say that the fact of his having been counseL for the
Earl of Zetland in other cases had not had the slightest influence on him in this
application ; but he felt it right to state that the only feeling on his mind was cue
of pity and compassion for Miss Fray, and that he regretted much to hear the
other day that she was suffering from some disease of the brain.
Mist Fray.-Oh, not now, my lord; I am quite well.
Rule refused.

